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Abstract. This article reviews the recent text, Posterity Lost: Progress, Ideology, and the Decline of the
American Family by Richard T. Gill and published (1997) by Rowman & Littlefield. The review highlights
recurring political psychological Issues of conceptualization, levels of analysis, and causality.
Posterity Lost: Progress, Ideology, and the Decline of the American Family attempts to support several
hypotheses concerning political psychological factors within the United States (US). (1) There's been a
massive breakdown of the family. (2) There's been a reversal of the significant concepts embodied in the
Idea of Progress--from a belief that the future will be better for succeeding generations to the converse.
(3) The empirical process of progress--usually defined through science and technology--at first helped
strengthen the family and the Idea of Progress, but later contributed to undermining them. (4) The Idea
of Progress--if it can be strengthened--can reverse the breakdown of the family. (5) The noxious effects
of the empirical process of progress on the family and on the Idea of Progress occur through the
process's intermediary consequences of increasing the perceived complexity of life, life choices, and
objective and subjective change. (6) To strengthen the family and the Idea of Progress and to protect
them from the empirical process of progress, restrictive moralities need to reappear or to increase their
salience as social control mechanisms and as internalized standards.
What are we to make of these hypotheses? They certainly have political psychological import, for they
involve (1) phenomena related to obtaining finite resources in the context of infinite physical,
psychological, and spiritual need (political) and (2) psychological elements comprising interpersonal
groupings, attitudes, beliefs, opinions, and emotionally and motivationally tinged cognitions and
behaviors. However, judging how successfully the author supports these hypotheses forces the reader
to confront recurring problems in political psychology and the social sciences.
Conceptualization. The reader can easily infer that the author is only concerned about families with twoparent families--each parent being of the opposite sex. The author does not make the case that this
approach as opposed to many other approaches to family--from single-parent to same-sex parents to
fantasized linkages with other people and ideas--is more adaptive in the present and in the future for all
people. The "massive breakdown" that he cites may suggest that his desired definition of family is
anything but adaptive for at least some significant minorities of people.
The author's Idea of Progress suggests some gross estimate of what the future may look like. For some
people this approach is indeed ecologically valid. However, for others, a more salient approach are Ideas
of Progress: professionally, socially, personally, as well as other dimensions--e.g., nationally,
internationally, medically, economically. Individual difference approaches to personality in scientific
psychology suggest that there will be a number of different approaches to some attitudinal sense of
progress.
In addition, the author does not consider that an Idea of Progress can be nonadaptive. For example,
optimism (1) can be illusory, (2) make one less likely to confront political coercion and evil, and (3)
increase self-enhancement while decreasing the accuracy of social perceptions. Are people without the
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Idea of Progress sadder but wiser? Psychologists would point out that some subtypes of emotionally
depressed people have more accurate self-perceptions than so-called normals.
The author's concept of restrictive morality seems to be imbued with the notion that monogamy is
good, as are sexless premarital relationships, God, and country. It's not that the author does not present
a coherent argument to support this notion for some people. It's just that there are many other
approaches to restrictive morality that may be adaptive for different groupings of people but are not
considered.
Levels of analysis. Given that the author is concerned with the welfare of US citizens, can one accept
that the author's concepts are more significant or as significant as more macromolecular and
micromolecular ones--from a sense of world citizenship on the one hand to the efficacy of selective
serotonin reuptake inhibitors on the other? And are concepts from other levels of analysis significant as
modifying and moderating variables? An explicit rationale for the author's level of analysis would be
valuable for the discerning reader.
Causality. A number of statistical techniques exist that get at the question of whether and when, for
example, the author's main concepts interact. Although he admirably argues that the same concept-viz., the empirical process of progress--may have different effects on the same concept--e.g., the family-at different points in time, he does not explicitly consider either statistically or through the reasoned
analysis of data that there may be other interactions--e.g., family breakdown undermining the empirical
process of progress or the Idea of Progress.
Three further concerns may prove helpful in reading the author's text. First, there have been other eras,
epochs, cultures, and societies in which family breakdown, ideas of progress, and moral strictures and
structures were perceived and analyzed. How can such data better inform the present discourse? For
example, as the author labels the present as the Postmodern Era, can one profitably engage in
comparative postmodernisms? Second, the author seems to have a preexisting bias for certain social
arrangements. He writes in his preface that "With such a wife, how could I not believe in the importance
of marriage and the family and the need to do whatever one can to help preserve these ancient and
honorable institutions?" (p. xvii). Because the author's personal life appears to be consonant with his
analysis, the reader needs to be on guard for at least unconscious propensities for analysis (biases)
consonant with such a life. Third, how to effectively implement restrictive moralities to give them a
chance to work their magic? Especially, restrictive moralities that have long been sought throughout
history by various political authorities to little lasting avail. More vice squads? Turning the US into a
theocracy through Constitutional change? Just saying no?
Posterity Lost is a coherently argued text by an author sincerely engaged with the collective welfare. It
not only presents an intriguing perspective on what needs to be done, but highlights recurring Issues in
political psychology and the social sciences that can only be managed, never resolved. (See Edgar, D.
(1991). 2001: A gentler world: The family and the future. Mental Health in Australia, 3, 43-48; Gill, R.T.
(1997). Posterity lost: Progress, ideology, and the decline of the American family. Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc.; Jost, J.T. (1995). Negative illusions: Conceptual clarification and psychological evidence
concerning false consciousness. Political Psychology, 16, 397-424; Kantor, D. (1983). The structuralanalytic approach to the treatment of family developmental crisis. Family Therapy Collections, 7, 12-34;
McWhinney, W. (1984). Alternative realities: Their impact on change and leadership. Journal of
Humanistic Psychology, 24, 7-38; Nettler, G. (1986). Construing the world. American Psychologist, 41,
480; Pilsiuk, M., & Parks, S.H. (1983). Social support and family stress. Marriage & Family Review, 6, 1372
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156; Regan, P. C., Snyder, M., & Kassin, S.M. (1995). Unrealistic optimism: Self-enhancement or person
positivity? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 1073-1082; Schulz, R., Bookwala, J., Knapp,
J.E., Scheier, M., et al. (1996). Pessimism, age, and cancer mortality. Psychology & Aging, 11, 304-309;
Tiedens, L. Z. (1997). Optimism and revolt of the oppressed: A comparison of two Polish Jewish ghettos
of World War II. Political Psychology, 18, 45-69; Wyatt, M. (1983). Sources of contemporary family life.
Issues in Radical Therapy, 11, 18-21.)(Keywords: Family, Morality, Progress.)
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